Operation Trident is effectively over now we are all vulnerable | Claudia Webbe
You told usMetropolitan police This article is more than 10 years oldOperation Trident is effectively over – now we are all vulnerable
This article is more than 10 years oldClaudia WebbeWith its murder investigation unit removed, the police unit has lost its core – and the trust of communities it sought to protectPolice confirmation that they had moved the central core of Operation Trident – its dedicated murder investigation unit – to the homicide and serious crime command, effectively signals the end of Trident, the London-based organisation I founded with other community activists in the mid-1990s.
Back then, while the culture of gun crime affected whole communities and neighbourhoods, 90% of homicide victims were black, mainly black men. The police response was woeful, using criminal "informants" who were themselves allowed to get away with so-called lesser crimes. Delroy Denton, for example, was left free to brutally rape a 15-year-old schoolgirl and murder Marcia Lawes, slashing her throat 18 times; and Eaton Green was allowed to continue dealing crack cocaine and committing armed robbery.
As a result of community pressure an inquiry was undertaken by the late Sir John Hoddinott, who was chief constable of Hampshire, which confirmed our worst fears: that the police had a better relationship with "criminal informants" than it did with law-abiding black people. The police tactics were flawed from the start; there were very few detections of and/or prosecutions for gun-related murders. Many in the black community believed the police were complicit in the way men of violence were taking hold of our neighbourhoods and estates, using guns to protect their crack cocaine trade.
We campaigned for change, arguing that tackling gun murders and enabling justice for victims and their families relied on the police building trust and confidence with the black community and working in partnership. A new low was reached in 1998 following the brutal murders of Avril Johnson in Brixton and Michelle Carby in Stratford.
However, despite the ongoing community pressure, it was not until the aftermath of the Lawrence inquiry that the then Met commissioner and home secretary finally agreed in 2000 to the establishment of a dedicated Trident operational command unit (OCU), established with over 200 staff to investigate gun murders disproportionately affecting black communities. The unit was to work closely with the already established Operation Trident independent advisory group.
Encouraging witnesses and members of the community to come forward required sensitivity, dedicated police time and specialist resources.
As an independent advisory group we worked hard to challenge the generally held negative perception that victims of gun crime were somehow complicit in their fate or, worse still, criminals themselves. The sensitive Trident murder investigations of innocent bystanders such as 17-year-old Annaka Pinto, murdered in Tottenham in 2007, and seven-year-old Toni-Ann Byfield – who was shot dead to prevent her from identifying her father's murderer – highlight the importance of our work.
Over time, gun murder victims and their families no longer felt ashamed to speak about their experiences. Trident cases require a particular dedication, cultural awareness and sensitivity, and when this is absent it has had a particular damaging impact on community relations.
Perpetrators of gun and violent crime had historically relied on a "culture of silence" and a "climate of fear" to avoid detection. Trident's success in driving down gun murders has been invaluable not only to the black community but also to London's population as a whole.
It is hugely detrimental and a retrograde step to learn that the dedicated murder investigation unit, the very heart and engine of Trident, is to be realigned or merged, watering down Trident's effect. Even more detrimental is the fact that this decision came without consultation or engagement, and this is a huge slap in the face to those of us who campaigned hard to establish Operation Trident.
In February 2012, and with no community consultation, London's mayor, Boris Johnson, relaunched Trident as a gang command unit: moving from tackling black, gun-related crime to tackling all violent crime relating to young people. Over the past year there has been a gradual whittling away of independent scrutiny of the operational effectiveness of Trident.
In disadvantaged areas with diverse populations and myriad economic and social problems, the slippery use of the language of "gangs" and its loose association with young people mitigates against effective policing, providing a dangerous shortcut to understanding youth conflict. The "gang", it seems, is sufficient explanation: there is no attempt to understand the broader and more complex social, cultural, economic and political context of youth violence. As a result there is a false and often racialised understanding of the preventative and proactive role of the police.
The strength of Trident – which sent a clear message to gun-wielding murderers and the criminal fraternity – within the black community is now weakened and its successes will become a thing of the past. It is hard now to see how its message that criminals will be hunted down and brought to justice will be enforced in the future.
Nobody has any wish to go back to the days when gun murders went largely undetected, with a community too frightened or lacking confidence in the police. Operation Trident was a model of good practice. But now political interference and the loss of its dedication, specialism and focus has left us all vulnerable.
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